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Bizarre interpretation of documents
Solid Post-Cold War historyIn "Grand Delusion" Israeli professor Gabriel Gorodetsky shows beyond reasonable doubt that Suvorov's arguments are ridiculous. He presents evidence that Stalin was not contemplating attack on Germany; but in fact was trying to avoid any confrontation with Germany while playing a compacted diplomatic game to limit Germany's political influence on the Balkans, particularly in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. He shows Stalin's obsessions with the Turkish Straits and Bulgaria, which wasn't new, but was an old Imperial policy of Russia for many years. I was surprised to learn how much "tsarist" Stalin's foreign policy really was - there was very little in it related to the communist ideology or "class struggle" theory of Karl Marx.
The failure to understand Hitler's bellicose plans was a result of Stalin's misjudgment of power structure and decision-making process in Berlin. As an extremely suspicious person, Stalin mistrusted everyone, but looks like he believed misleading information presented to him by opponents of Hitler's policy such as Count Werner Von Schulenburg (German ambassador to Moscow, who became later a leading figure of anti-Hitler failed coup) and Ribbentrop. Stalin mistrusted equally both Churchill and Hitler and attributed all warning signals to England's efforts to drag Russia into war with Germany. Also Stalin didn't believe that Hitler would allow Wehrmacht to fight on two fronts. German double agents "Litseist" encouraged this false believe. The Germans succeeded in their sophisticated disinformation campaign, which coupled with Stalin's wishful thinking, led Russians to believe that Germany was not planning to invade Russia at least in the near future.
Gorodetsky points out that the idea of a preventive war was embedded in the German (from Frederick the Great to Moltke) rather than the Russian military tradition. "Barbarossa" plan was devised to quickly crash Russia in quick 10-week war and to free Hitler's hands to complete his "mastery of Europe". Then he would take care of England without any distractions from the "Soviet Empire". It looked like everything was working just wonderful for Nazi Germany until June 22, 1941 - the beginning of the German invasion to Russia (which by the way started suddenly without any declaration or ultimatum). But it turned out that the Germans seriously underrated the opponent and seriously miscalculated the amount of the effort they would need to crush Russia. Sure, the German might was incredible, but so was German overconfidence. Hitler's disparaging attitude towards Russian "vermin" makes ridiculous the theory of preemptive strike. Gorodetsky shows that this attitude was widespread in the West - Sir Winston Churchill himself was prone to disparaging attitude towards Stalin and the Red Army.
But just before his attack on Russia Hitler was beating Stalin at his own game. Stalin's failure to prepare for the German onslaught, which cost many Russian lives, was a result of his own self-deception and wishful thinking. Although Stalin was very wily, I feel that he lacked formal education to think abstractly and deal with issues like, for example, proverbial German concept of "Drang nach Osten" or draw analogies from history. Although as a Georgian, he was obsessed with history of the Black sea and repercussions of potential German capture of the Turkish Straits. 150 years earlier the Grand Army of Napoleon stood looking across the English Channel - but there was nowhere for it to go - except to Russia. It seems to me again in June 1941 the same gravitational force was pulling 200 idle German divisions to the endless Russian steppes. Where else would these "drunk with success" armies go?
I really liked the book. This scholarly and dry book was not an easy read. But the amount of information looked at is enormous and the quality of analysis is good. Also for the first time the reliance is not only on the German and British sources, but also on the declassified Russian archives. The book de-romanticizes many myths and accounts, including well-known Churchill's history of WWII, which is "persuasive but excessively self-centered and therefore occasionally misleading interpretation of events". I highly recommend this book to everybody interested in reading a non-Disney history of WWII.
ExcellentThe book suggests that Hitler's decision to attack the Soviet Union was in fact not something which was cast in stone. Hitler and the German High Command also looked at alternate plans to end the war in Africa by the seizing of Gibraltar. Whilst this occurred Stalin seized a buffer zone in Romania and started to negotiate with Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. It would seem that it was the Soviet Policy in the Balkans which led the German leadership to decide on Barabarossa.
Stalin at all times is portrayed in the book as totally pragmatic in deciding foreign policy. The Soviets in fact had more complete spy networks than the British. Stalin made on fatal miscalculation and that related to his assessment of the power structure in Germany. He believed that the German leadership was split on whether an invasion of Russia should occur. He thought that it would be possible to negotiate and to gain time through some form of appeasement. The reality was that although some German figures such as Ribbentrop were against Barbarossa they had no real power. The German ambassador to the Soviet Union fanned these hopes. He in fact hoped that Germany would not invade and ended up joining the plot against Hitler in 1944.
Stalin realised when France fell that the Soviet Union was in great danger. Not only did Germany have the best army in Europe but the Red Army was in disarray. The purges meant that 70% of serving officers had only been in their positions for less than a year. There were substantial problems in supplying units with ammunition and fuel. The T 34 tank had just been put into production and deliveries were slow.
Stalin hoped that if Germany was to invade Yugoslavia it would set back their time table by a month and delay the invasion of the Soviet Union by a year. Instead the crushing of Yugoslavia only took a few days. Stalin was eager for his army to remain passive and that it not provoke the Germans. He in turn hoped to stall events whilst Soviet factories cranked out munitions and tanks to try to get the Red Army in shape. When the warning came from Churchill to Stalin he was aware of the German preparations. It was viewed by the Russians however as an attempt to embroil them in the war rather than anything else.
In recent years some revisionists have suggested that there was some chance that the Soviets might attack Germany first. The book shows that this could not have happened. Zhukov raised the issue but Stalin was not keen because of the state of the Army. Zhulov himself later suggested that if a spoiling attack had taken place the Germans would have defeated it easily captured Moscow in 1941. A first class book which explains the moves prior to the German Soviet War.


Not as good as it looks
Disappointing book, lot of errors, insuficient information.
Not the Best, but a Great Book to Have Open During the RacesIt was nice to open the book up to the Hockenheim page, for example, to see the chicanes, the long straightaways, the S-curve into the stadium section, etc. TV coverage might have one graphic that shows the whole circuit, but with the book beside me on the couch, I can refer to it throughout the race.
I like how the tracks are laid out on the pages. The tracks are colorful, they detail general speeds at various points on the track, and they feature a footnote about a famous incident or two over the years.
I know that there are more comprehensive books out there about the F1 circuits, but for a guy just getting into the sport, the book was PERFECT for me.


Ehhh.
Anna Anderson, russian princess or not?
CommentToo many people have chosen to forget the evidence that supports Anna Anderson's claim to be Anastasia.
The intimate knowledge she had of the Grand Duke Ernest of Hesse visit to Russia in 1916, the fact that she had the same problem with her feet as Anastasia, and of course the fact she could speak English, German and French and understand Russian, this would have to be a remarkable feet for a poor Polish factory worker.
It seems to be forgotten that in 1977 a prominent forensic expert, idetified Anna Anderson to be either Anastasia or an identical twin.
As for the DNA results, consider this. Even today the Romanov family are one of the most powerful familys that exsist in the world today. For them to cover up the actual results of the test so as to save face, would be a simple task. And why would they want to do this? Because the Romanovs doe not want the world to know the truth, and that is that they new Anna Anderson was the Grand Dutchess Annastasia but denied her, her title and her inheritence for pure greed.


Not worth the time to read.
A Slow Start but a Great TourI think the alterations in Moore's usual style arise from his subject, Thomas Coryate, whose 1608 trip through the Continent inaugurated the British tradition of the grand tour (Coryate also introduced the fork, the umbrella, and the travel narrative to his native land). Coryate was a serious and pompous traveler who couldn't resist copying down every engraving and measuring every column he encountered. Moore responds by doing some actual research and interrupting his usual hysterical rants with actual facts.
Unfortunately, Moore hasn't quite mastered seamless blending of information and narrative, and as a result this book is a bit slower and denser than his other two books. And although Moore manages to evoke quite a bit of sympathy and sadness for Coryate, he never seems totally comfortable with more serious writing. The result is a somewhat uneven book that takes a while to get moving.
But Moore finally hits his stride while writing about Venice, and Grand Tour takes off. The last half of the book is laugh-out-loud funny, a marvelously fun romp that makes the whole book worth reading. And Moore throws in a few unusual extras on top of the laughs; he conveys a clear picture of the Europe of 1608 as well as the Europe of today, and an even clearer picture of Thomas Coryate. Though much of the book had me rolling with laughter, I finished with a lump in my throat for the man Moore calls "poor old Tom."
All in all, Grand Tour is well worth buying. However, if you haven't read any Tim Moore, this book probably isn't the best place to start - try Frost on My Moustache or French Revolutions first.
in my humble and brief opinion

HO-HUM! WHO???For me, the upshot is a re-reading of `A Lifelong Passion: Nicholas And Alexandra'. Now even in the 20 years of letters that are mostly by Nicholas and Alexandra to each other, there are numerous letters/excerpts from and to Xenia in `A Lifelong Passion' which give a *much* better idea and feel of "Xenia" than *this* bland lollipop of a book! And meanwhile, I'll just go on waiting for someone to come along and write Xenia's *real* biography...
Not The Full Story, By Any MeansThis book tends to be a bit dull because there is very little first hand information that come directly from Xenia. We never get the full names of her lover or lovers, for example. Much of what we are told is extrapolated, for instance we are told that Xenia was shocked by Rasputin, but there seems to be no evidence that she ever met him! (Olga's memories of Rasputin are among the most compelling sections of The Last Grand Duchess). Because there seems to be so little real information about Xenia's own personality, the authors spend an inordinate amount of time on unnecessary details, like for example, who her visitors were on her birthdays and what they wrote to her in letters (Few of Xenia's own letters seem to have been located and used.)
So this is a fairly interesting book with some new details about Xenia's life and family, but by reading it you are not going to feel that you knew her or have any real sense of what she was like as a person.
Xenia bought into focusThis is the first full biography of Xenia's life. The first section dealing with her life as a member of the imperial family in Russia is not terribly enlightening. This is probably a reflection of lack of documentation available, and the fact that Xenia was naturally a shy and retiring person.
Where this book comes into it's own and provides masses of new information is in dealing with Xenia (and the Royal families) experience in the Russian revolution and in her life in exile after the revolution. Xenia became the hub of a large family and the focal point of many émigrés in her long exile and this book brings that into focus at last.
This book also has a pile of new Romanov illustrations, though sadly missing any of Xenia in all her court finery, we do get to see photos her large extended family at last.
This book is actually a UK publication, and can be bought cheaper at amazon.co.uk
If you are interested in the life of the Romanov survivors after the revolution this a book worth buying.


For neither the scientist or the layman
Should be called Roger Penrose attempt to expose his work
Exposes frontier issues & jargon in particle physicsLike another reviewer, I was not happy with one-third of the book being devoted to twistors, since these strike this outsider as higher on mathematical elegance than on physical content. I will not fault Peat, however, for doing this since: A) due to his friendship with the Penrose Twistor group he is specially qualified to popularise this subject, and B) the Twistor program, a child of Penrose's brain, is rich in guiding principles, and provides therefore a healthy antidote to the superstrings, which grew up higgeldy-piggeldy by a sequence of "accidental" discoveries -- "It seems to work, but, heck, we don't really know why." Twistors have been less a matter of trial and error. At least they work well for massless particles. (Sidelight: In a blackboard discussion w/ Penrose at Cal Tech that I chanced to overhear about 25 yrs. ago, Feynman told Penrose that no one had succeeded in making massless fields cohere together so as to act like massive fields.)


Sad, sad, sad...The problems began even before the first page... in the very TITLE itself. "A marvelous Work and a Wonder", a reference to Isaiah 29:14, is claimed by the author to be a prophecy pointing to Joseph Smith. However, Mat 15:7-8 clearly indicates that this exact same prophecy is specifically fulfilled in Jesus Christ, God in the flesh.
The abominable butchering of God's word continues non-stop throughout the first few chapters, and I'm quite certain it continues on throughout... If you are going to read this book, make sure to check out every reference and read each one IN FULL CONTEXT. The overwhelming errors will be plainly apparent.
Studies of the Book of Mormon
An excellent Missionary tool

A pedestrian examination of two pivotal impeachments.
Accessible but sadly outdated survey of the subject.Chief Justice Rehnquist's book extols executive and judicial independence -- unexceptional and unexceptionable positions, to be sure -- but he also implicitly denounces the actions of democratically-elected legislatures -- a position more open to question, even as it is consistent with much of his constitutional jurisprudence as shown in Sue Davis, JUSTICE REHNQUIST AND THE CONSTITUTION (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).
Ultimately, perhaps, readers may value this book for its potential illumination of the presiding officer over the Senate's trial of President Clinton, but it adds little or nothing to our understanding of the history and law of the impeachment process. -- Richard B. Bernstein, Adjunct Professor of Law, New York Law School
A good review of Historical bases for impeachment decisions

Intellectual history
Great intellectual history
broad world view

A very frustrated read and waste of time
A real page turner!!!
Great!
The way in which G. interprets for example diary-entries of Dimitroff is absurd and completely misleading. Luckily these diaries have now been published in german language (Aufbau Verlag) so that everyone can read for himself what Dimitroff really wrote - in full - and not just the selective parts Gorodetsky presents.
Also, the way in which Gorodetsky presents the clearly offensive soviet force disposition in 1941 is a bit of remarkable absurdity.
Gorodetsky claims in one sentence to have corrected Suvorov's claims that Stalin was preparing an offensive against Germany. But how? Where is Gorodetsky showing that the numerous arguments of Suvorov are actually wrong?
The next bit of absurdity is that Gorodetsky writes that soviet doctrine was clearly offensive - but of course not in reality.
Another proof of Gorodetsky's fear to provide full documentation is that he doesen't provide the full text of the "Considerations..." from May 15th, 1941 where a preemtive strike against Germany was advocated by the General Staff. Gorodetsky claims that this document was written behind Stalin's back and that it has never been approved. Anyone who knows only a fraction about the great purges of Stalin in the Red Army can clearly see the bizarre absurdity of such a claim. Vassilievsky, Zhukov and Timoshenko would have ended in the hands of the NKVD and would have been executed had they written such a proposal against Stalin's intentions!
Gorodetsky knows that would he provide such important documents with their full text, the reader would reach quite different conclusions than claimed in the book. That's why Gorodetsky most of the time quotes documents that can't be checked by the readers.
One should rather read Joachim Hoffmann's "Stalin's war of extermination" or Albert Weeks forthcoming "Stalin's other war. Soviet Grand Strategy 1939-1941" because there one can find proper documentation and learn about Stalin's real intentions.